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Unemployedmobilisation in times of democratisation:
the Union of Unemployed Graduates in post-Ben Ali
Tunisia
Irene Weipert-Fenner
Research Department ‘Intrastate Conﬂict’, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Frankfurt,
Germany
ABSTRACT
The Union of Unemployed Graduates (UDC) is the only organisation of
unemployed individuals in Tunisia that operates nation-wide. Though it grew
in membership and outreach after 2011, it has failed to develop into a key
actor for the increasingly mobilised unemployed, who do not join or build
formal organisations. The latter reject co-operation because they perceive the
UDC to be weak and ‘politicized’. The article examines this assessment using
interviews and focus groups conducted during extensive ﬁeldwork and
Facebook posts made by the unemployed union. An analysis of UDC’s internal
dynamics and of the precautions it takes to remain autonomous from societal
and political actors only partially supports this accusation. Instead,
fragmentation is better explained by state responses that reward isolated
protesters with limited demands rather than negotiating with actors in
organisations to reach sustainable solutions.
KEYWORDS Unemployment; youth; social movements; Arab Spring; political transformation; contentious
politics
Introduction
While the political system in Tunisia has been undergoing a fairly successful
process of democratisation, socio-economic protests1 have reached record
highs: an analysis based on the Armed Conﬂict Location &Event Data Project
(ACLED) database (Raleigh et al. 2010) showed that, in 2016, they outnum-
bered political protests and even surpassed the number of protest events
measured during the 2010/2011 revolution (Vatthauer and Weipert-Fenner
2017, 11).2 On its own, this observation might not seem particularly
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astonishing considering that Tunisia’s democratic opening came with a tre-
mendous increase in political and civil rights that have allowed for more
public protests and free speech. What is remarkable, however, is that the
sharp increase in socio-economic protests did not occur immediately after
the fall of dictatorship but rather four years later. It coincided with a
growing disappointment in the socio-economic output of democracy,
reﬂected, for instance, in the Arab Barometer survey.3 Besides workers protest-
ing for better working conditions and higher salaries, the ACLED data showed
that these protests are largely driven by unemployed individuals. At the same
time that their protests were increasing in number, protests by the unem-
ployed became more fragmented and single-issue focused: their major
demand is personal employment in the public sector or the civil service (Vat-
thauer and Weipert-Fenner 2017, 10, 13). Another study based on ethno-
graphic ﬁeldwork in Tunisia revealed that they are mostly conducted by
actors who operate outside of formal organisations; they are spontaneous,
horizontal, locally limited and have increasingly tended to rely on disruptive
techniques such as blocking roads or railways. Many protests continue for
weeks or months at a time, with protesters making use of their main
resources: time and public space. Furthermore, it is striking that active co-
operation with societal and political actors which existed prior to the revolu-
tion has ceased (Hamdi and Weipert-Fenner 2017).4
Given this general trend of growing fragmentation among unemployed
protesters, this article investigates the only organisation of unemployed
that operates nation-wide, the Union of Unemployed Graduates (better
known by the French acronym, UDC – Union des Diplômés Chômeurs). The
article asks why the UDC has neither become a unifying or mediating actor
nor a role model for the autonomous unemployed protesters who constitute
the vast majority of unemployed mobilisation.
The origins of the UDC date back to 2006. The unemployed organisation
started with only a few hundred activists who demanded a reform of nontran-
sparent and corrupt procedures through which public-sector jobs were distrib-
uted among university graduates.5 Operating illegally during the Ben Ali
regime, the most prominent act of mobilisation was the UDC’s participation
in the popular uprising in the Gafsa mining basin in 2008. The organisation
helped sustain andorganise theprotests in co-operationwith local trade union-
ists.6 It also had an impact at the discursive level: the UDC’s major slogan
‘shughl, hurriyya, karama wataniyya’ (work, freedom and national dignity)
was adopted and widely chanted in the 2008 uprising in the Gafsa region.
During the 2010/2011 uprising as well, ‘work, freedom, and national dignity’
became a central slogan heard from the outset of the revolution. It served as
a perfect umbrella phrase for the more socially and economically motivated
protesters from the Tunisian hinterland as well as for protesters from coastal
regions who focused on political rights (Allal 2013; Chomiak 2011).
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Finally attaining legal registration after the revolution, the UDC expanded
its membership base along with its regional and local oﬃces while also devel-
oping internal democratic structures and a set of broader political demands.
During interviews for this study, however, independent protesters voiced two
reasons as to why they refrained from co-operating with the UDC: the organ-
isation is too weak and too politicised.7 Both reasons require explanation and
contextualisation, especially in accounting for why autonomous protesters,
whose mobilisation base has been shrinking to the family or neighbourhood
level (cf. Hamdi and Weipert-Fenner 2017), believe they are stronger when
demonstrating by themselves than as part of a relatively well-established
organisation.
Seeking to identify the reasons as to why the organisation has been incap-
able of becoming an inﬂuential actor, this article ﬁrst introduces the broader
social meaning of unemployment, particularly for university graduates.8
Second, it analyses UDC activism since 2011 along with its major demands
and other internal developments that may account for fragmentation
among the unemployed. Third, the article analyses UDC’s relationships with
societal and political actors, reﬂecting the extent to which the UDC can be
regarded as ‘politicized’, a term used to delegitimize an actor for only pursuing
partisan goals instead of the public good and for instrumentalizing others for
his/her own interests. A closer look into state responses to unemployed pro-
tests in the fourth section helps explain this observation: the incentive struc-
ture inherited from Tunisia’s authoritarian past and set by successive
governments since 2011 rewards ‘non-political’ protests, i.e. protests that do
not raise demands for broad political change and are carried out by small
autonomous groups of activists on the local level and do not form alliances.
Yet, the blame for a lack of positive results through cooperation rests with
parties and organisations. Strikingly, even local UDC activists act according
to this pattern. The concluding section contextualises these ﬁndings by con-
sidering other unemployed organisations in the MENA region.
The study draws from ﬁeldwork in Tunisia, semi-structured interviews,
focus groups and participant observations to reconstruct the activists’
interpretations of their situation and the meaning they ascribe to their grie-
vances. Interviews with political and societal actors concerning their percep-
tion of the UDC complement this data.9 In addition, an event data set was
established using UDC Facebook posts made by regional oﬃces and by the
national oﬃce for the period between September 2011 and June 2015. As
Facebook has become a major medium of internal and external communi-
cation for the UDC since 2011, a collection of data based on UDC posts
served to create an overview of the development of activities, of the
speciﬁc form of activities (particularly diﬀerent forms of protest), their regional
distribution, and the claims made; additional desk research was conducted on
every single event to ﬁnd further information. As media coverage about UDC
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activities has been fairly limited (which is discussed later as a lack of public
responsiveness to UDC mobilisation), media analysis did not generate com-
prehensive additional data e.g. about state responses or reactions from
societal actors. I therefore rely on 226 protest events and public declarations
in total and use them to gain deeper insights into internal activities in the
section on mobilisation. As the dataset does not present information on the
impact of the single events in terms of number of participants or bystanders,
it only provides one additional, albeit limited, source of information on UDC
activism since 2011.
The social meaning of unemployment
In Tunisia, as in other resource-poor countries in North Africa, authoritarian
regimes pursued a state-led developmental model in the 1960s that
included jobs for university graduates as part of a ‘social contract’
(Hertog 2016). Until the 1980s and early 1990s, the public and governmen-
tal sector absorbed young people willing to enter the job market. This was
interpreted as the ‘authoritarian bargain’ (Desai, Olofsgard, and Yousef
2009): in exchange for political loyalty, the state ensured welfare and
jobs. The latter also provided access to social protections such as health
insurance and pension funds, while also presenting education as a guaran-
tee for social mobility (cf. Hafaïedh 2000). When Tunisia embarked on neo-
liberal reforms in the late 1980s, however, privatisation and liberalisation
reduced the number of jobs that the regime could distribute via the
public sector. This particularly aﬀected university graduates: budget cuts
led to lower investment in public education, creating a gap between
mass academic institutions and a small number of grandes écoles for a pri-
vileged minority. The option of studying abroad – most importantly in
Europe – was increasingly closed for ordinary Tunisians. Along with the
diminishing quality of education, the number of university graduates on
the job market increased drastically, from 121,000 in 1997 to 336,000 in
2007 (Timoumi 2013, 118).
With shrinking job opportunities in the civil service sector and growing
numbers of graduates, unemployment rates among university graduates
rose from 3.8 per cent (1994) and 8.6 per cent (1999) to 14.0 per cent
(2005) and 22.9 per cent (2010) (Touhami 2012). The oﬃcial total unemploy-
ment rate remained between 13–14 per cent in the 2000s. After the ouster of
Ben Ali, unemployment rose sharply to 19 per cent in 2011, hovering around
15 per cent since 2012.10 However, the share of unemployed graduates
increased dramatically to 30 per cent and has remained at this high level
ever since.11 In addition, educational meritocracy in job distribution became
increasingly supplanted by clientelism, a diﬀerent social mechanism for distri-
bution. Here, familial and regional solidarities overshadowed qualiﬁcations,
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with only a minority enjoying privileges and the majority feeling excluded
(Hafaïedh 2000).
With these statistics in mind, one speciﬁc aspect to stress about this type of
unemployed movement (the movement of unemployed university graduates)
is that the activists had never been employed before, at least not in their
understanding of proper employment. As such, they therefore claim a right
to work that they have never held. In the understanding of unemployed pro-
testers, this right is violated if they are forced to work in the informal sector,
are only temporarily contracted in the formal sector or have a job that does
not correspond to their level of academic education (Hamdi and Weipert-
Fenner 2017).12 They demand employment in the public sector and civil
service, since such positions still oﬀer social beneﬁts hardly found in the
private sector and certainly not in the informal sector – socio-economic
beneﬁts to which they feel entitled due to their higher education. As
Hertog (2016, 14) argues, this expectation may be a legacy of former populist
policies. The activists who were interviewed, however, held absolutely no
degree of romanticism for the times under the dictatorship. They exhibited
no willingness to forgo their newly acquired political liberties in exchange
for employment, rather seeking to ﬁght for socio-economic rights by using
these new political rights.
In contrast to many other cases of unemployed movements outside of the
MENA region (e.g. Chabanet and Faniel 2012; Giugni 2008; Reiss and Perry
2011), the root of grievances is not based on exclusion from the labour
market, but on the imposed situation of waiting for inclusion. This phenom-
enon is part of a larger social issue, often labelled as ‘waithood’ (Dhillon
and Yousef 2009; Singerman 2007) which predominates delayed adulthood
due to the lack of resources, most importantly work. Without regular
income, other aspects of adulthood, such as founding a family through mar-
riage or moving out of the parents’ home, are all put on hold. Back in 2000,
Hafaïedh described how waiting had become the pervasive situation
among university graduates, supported by a state system created to cover
up the status of waithood through internships or annual recruitment exams
(those who did not pass merely waited for the next round). In the context
of the authoritarian social contract, waithood also reﬂected a submission to
the state as a welfare provider (Hafaïedh 2000).
Young people stuck in the phase of adolescence were long associated with
passivity, and agency was only found in individual coping strategies. Honwana
(2014) ﬁnds collective action against waithood to hold transformative poten-
tial, though ‘only’ as spontaneous protests without sustained and organised
mobilisation. Unemployedmobilisationmust be understood against this back-
drop. Activists try to overcome waithood, ﬁrst, by recognising the situation for
what it is: rather than seeking excuses for informal economic activities or
waiting for the next round of recruitment exams, they deﬁne themselves as
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unemployed. The same holds true for individuals with temporary contracts
and jobs perceived as inadequate for university graduates. Unemployment
has therefore become an element of identity in a political struggle that
aims to reclaim the right to work to escape ‘waithood’. As UDC general sec-
retary Salam al-Ayari stated: ‘You have to be active for the right to work.
You cannot wait for it. There are people who have been waiting for 17 years.’13
Finally, unemployment is connected to another major issue: development,
especially in the marginalised southern regions and the interior parts of
Tunisia. Before the revolution in 2010, 90 per cent of new jobs and enterprises
were created in the coastal governorates of Tunis, Bizerte, Nabeul, Sousse,
Monastir and Sfax (Boughzala and Hamdi 2014, 6). Resource extraction (phos-
phate and oil) alongwith agriculture have been the primary sources of employ-
ment in Tunisia’s hinterland, yet the majority of proﬁts from these sectors
continue to be channelled into the centres of economic prosperity until
today. Although successive governments have made attempts since the
1960s to overcome the regional divide by promoting education and infrastruc-
ture, this declared aim has never been achieved. The interior regions fail to
attract private and foreign direct investment and even public funds ﬂow to
centres of prosperity to a large extent. Improvements in education in the mar-
ginalised regions have not led to job creation, but rather to a greater awareness
of persisting inequality (Hibou 2015; Vatthauer andWeipert-Fenner 2017). This
fact is directly reﬂected in the activism of unemployed graduates in Tunisia,
especially since 2011.
Growing stronger, remaining weak: UDC’s internal
development since 2011
After the toppling of the Ben Ali regime, UDC’s membership has today swelled
to 16,000 (of a population of 10 million), with between 2,000 and 3,000 active
members.14 The organisation has also developed internal democratic pro-
cedures. In 2013, an executive board was elected with founding member
and long-term UDC leader Salam al-Ayari oﬃcially becoming the general sec-
retary. Mobilisation increased in spite of the UDC’s very limited resources.
According to the Facebook posts, there were 30 protest events in 2012, 42
in 2013, 56 in 2014 and a sharp increase to 80 in the ﬁrst half of 2015
alone. Yet, these numbers appear relatively small compared to protest
event numbers of the unemployed outside of the UDC. For instance, in the
governorate of Gafsa, where the majority of protests are staged by the auton-
omous unemployed, the Tunisian NGO Forum Tunisien des Droits Économiques
et Sociaux (FTDES) counted 386 events between March 2014 and June 2015.15
New resources such as social media, which have been freely accessible
since 2011, have been used to establish networks and promote communi-
cation among them. Rather than investing time and money into creating
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websites or printed publications, the UDC mostly uses Facebook to share
information about its activities. Both the national and the local and regional
oﬃces publish declarations and open letters, post videos and share links
among one another. This organisational professionalisation has been
achieved with very limited ﬁnancial resources and is based on volunteer
work. It succeeded in attracting media attention for the general secretary,
who has become the UDC’s well-known public face. Apart from this,
however, UDC activists perceive public attention as relatively low, particularly
for single protest events.16 This is also reﬂected in the claims made: based on
the Facebook data set, the demand for employment and a critique of recruit-
ment procedures were the most important issues raised through UDC mobil-
isation (see below). Yet from 2014 on, the share of activities driven by
solidarity with unheard protests increased, with two thirds of solidarity pro-
tests being staged in 2015,17 placing even greater pressure on an organisation
with very limited resources. Also, the forms of activism have developed in a
way that reﬂects a need to draw more attention: sit-ins and demonstrations
were the major form of mobilisation after 2011 but, from 2014 onwards, the
growing number of hunger strikes underlines the fact that unemployed
graduates see few other means of creating pressure on the government
other than through their own lives and health.18 The UDC also has not
gained access to any material resources from the state. Tunisian politicians
have never resorted to the strategy of providing it with state resources in
order to placate the situation and eventually co-opt the organisation.19 Con-
sequently, the UDC has never had much to oﬀer and cannot claim any political
victories, which have fostered the image of weakness.
Based on its Facebook posts, a closer look at the demands raised by the
UDC in other forms of collective action uncovers three major issues: (1) the
call for employment (38 per cent), (2) the reform of recruitment procedures
(27 per cent) and (3) a critique of state responses to protests (24 per cent).
These exhibit a large degree of overlap with general issues related to unem-
ployment. Furthermore, they help translate the grievances held by most
unemployed into political demands that can be channelled into the political
discourse and could imbue the movement with additional strength for achiev-
ing its aims. During the interviews, the educational system was also heavily
criticised for not properly preparing students for the job market, instead
churning out ever more university graduates without a real prospect for
decent employment afterwards.20 Yet, this topic has not played a role in
any actual UDC activities, which might be due to the low degree of public res-
onance it enjoys, particularly among non-graduates.
Regarding the ﬁrst topic, the demand for employment covers the call for
personal employment raised on the local level as well as a general call for
job creation. Local activism by the UDC, which is mainly conducted indepen-
dently of the national oﬃce, often follows the same logic: activists stage
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protests and (increasingly) hunger strikes for their own employment and as a
last hope for addressing their personal grievances.21 The national leadership,
however, has criticised successive governments for creating unproductive
jobs and distributing them to protest actors simply to alleviate the situation
rather than recruiting the best people for sustainable jobs.22 This demand is
often connected to the topic of regional development in Tunisia’s margina-
lised interior. As the UDC has been present in these regions from the begin-
ning, this would, in principle, provide grounds for co-operation with other
unemployed at the local level which could turn into a powerful pillar of the
organisation. Given this connection of employment and regional develop-
ment, the dividing line between the UDC and independent unemployed pro-
testers seems even more surprising and calls for further explanation.
Second, non-transparent procedures for creating lists of job prospects or
new employees and their recurrent manipulation has sparked protest
actions. For the UDC, the concours system – annual recruitment exams that
are meant to identify the most qualiﬁed candidates – is the major point of cri-
tique. Meritocracy is promised but not implemented; as such, one regular
demand is to make these procedures more transparent, such as by integrating
a UDC member within the supervisory board of these exams. In spite of some
speciﬁcities of the concours system, corrupt recruitment has also recurrently
triggered large-scale unemployed protests without any organisational struc-
tures, such as the 2008 Gafsa revolt or the latest major wave of protests
from January 2016, starting in Kasserine, and spilling over to other margina-
lised regions as well as to the capital Tunis.23
The third major point raised in UDC activism is the perception that all gov-
ernments since 2011 have exhibited the same behaviour towards unem-
ployed protesters: neglect and eventual repression. This category mostly
increased starting at the end of 2013.24 Shortly after the revolution, there
was, in fact, some political willingness to integrate the UDC. Immediately
after the fall of the Ben Ali regime, the UDC became part of the extended
Higher Commission for the Fulﬁllment of Revolutionary Goals, Political
Reform, and Democratic Transition, an interim body that managed the early
stage of the political transformation process. Yet, political participation
would end here. The UDC was not represented in the National Constituent
Assembly nor included in the National Dialogue which helped bring the pol-
itical transition to its successful conclusion and which was fostered by four
civil society organisations, including the trade union federation UGTT (Anto-
nakis-Nashif 2016, 138). The Social Dialogue between the UGTT and the
employers’ association UTICA took place without the presence of the UDC
as well. On the regional level, negotiations between governors occasionally
take place on an ad-hoc basis, lacking an institutionalised form, and are reg-
ularly cancelled or delayed by state actors.
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The lack of inclusion and recognition as a negotiation partner has increas-
ingly led to protests by the UDC. The same applies to protests against repres-
sion, mainly in the form of the legal prosecution of UDC activists. In interviews,
activists claimed that political discourse andmainstreammedia have sidelined
socio-economic claims since the revolution. Instead, the focus had been on
the transition to a democratic regime, i.e. on the election and work of the
National Constituent Assembly (2011–2014) as well as on the increasing polar-
isation between the Islamist Party al-Nahda and Nidaa Tunis. As this polaris-
ation turned violent through politically motivated assassinations against
left-wing politicians in 2013, and even more so after terrorist attacks in
2015, security questions have assumed greater prominence within public dis-
course. This eventually resulted in the criminalisation of social movements in
general, particularly in Tunisia’s marginalised regions. They are portrayed as
fuelling disorder and chaos and paving the way for terrorism.25 This delegiti-
mizing mainstream discourse has contributed to a general fatigue with pro-
tests and strikes, which has negatively aﬀected public resonance for
unemployed protesters.
In sum, expansion and professionalisation characterised the UDC’s post-
2011 development. Yet resources remain scarce, political victories few and
the size and number of protests of the UDC small compared to autonomous
protests. While this might present an impression of weakness to the unem-
ployed outside of the UDC, at the same time, the actual content of protests
and their dynamics – i.e. an increase in the number of protests due to the
loss of patience with the new political system – shows the strong degree of
overlap among all unemployed. In some areas such as reforms to recruitment
procedures, unemployed grievances were also translated into political
demands. The idea of rallying together to be stronger as a uniﬁed actor
would appear almost inevitable to the outside observer. Yet, even local
UDC activism remains fragmented and isolated from other unemployed pro-
tests. This becomes evident when considering the relationships with societal
and political actors in the next section.
Politicised or running from politics? UDC’s relation with social
and political actors
The perception that the UDC is aﬃliated to politics, held by many unemployed
outside of the union, did not emerge out of the blue. The very idea of found-
ing a graduate unemployed organisation was born within the students’ union
(Union générale des étudiants de Tunisie – UGET), and the ﬁrst UDC activists had
all been active UGET members. This accounts for the UDC’s high level of
organisational skills from the outset, beyond the fact that university graduates
generally possess relatively high organisational skills as it is.26 Not only did
UGET provide a pool of previously mobilised individuals willing to join the
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UDC after graduation, it also contributed a network of people who had estab-
lished mutual trust during years of joint activism. The UDC was also able to
build on prior experiences with claim-making and draw from a common fra-
mework for interpreting the political, social and economic situation of Tunisia.
This framework or political orientation, however, has traditionally been leftist
(cf. Moore 1965, 175). Today, this agenda includes pronounced criticism of
neoliberal policies, especially privatisation and the role of international
ﬁnancial institutions.
The same holds for the trade union federation Union générale tunisienne du
travail (UGTT), historically an ally of the UGET. Drawing on its legacy of the
ﬁght for independence from France, and because of its high, nation-wide
organisational capacities, the UGTT retained an important role as a collective
actor representing the Tunisian working class, even during the dictatorship –
although its leadership was regarded as co-opted by the Ben Ali regime
(Beinin 2016, 103; Netterstrøm 2016, 384, 488, 393). Local cadres, in particular,
remained impervious to political interference, which led to the perception of
the UGTT as the sole organisation in which dissent could be voiced. The trade
union federation was an umbrella organisation for various sorts of socio-econ-
omic and political claims and provided support and shelter for both the UGET
and the UDC (Yousﬁ 2015, 56–57). The alliance of UGTT, UGET and UDC has
served as a natural career of activism through diﬀerent stages of life in
which the UDC represented the bridge from student activism to labour
activism.27
After 2011, cracks began forming in what once appeared to be a ﬁrm pol-
itical block with which UDC was associated. After the revolution, the UGTT
expanded its political role, both as a broker of the National Dialogue and as
the oﬃcial representative of social demands within the Social Dialogue. The
tripartite negotiations between the UGTT, the employers’ association (Union
tunisienne de l’industrie, du commerce et de l’artisanat – UTICA) and the govern-
ment increased the power of the trade union federation, and potentially that
of its allies. On the other hand, as Chabanet (2012, 44) noted for the case of
France, this form of social dialogue has limited the inﬂuence of other organ-
isations and movements and made them dependent on the trade unions. In
Tunisia as well, this dependence was increasingly perceived as exploitation by
the trade union: UDC activists felt they were being used for creating additional
pressure when needed and as soon as the UGTT sat at the negotiation table
with political actors, workers’ interests, such as the salary gains, were all that
mattered and the needs of the unemployed ignored.28 To some extent, this
has been the result of a competition for shares of the state budget, with
UGTT ﬁrmly rooted in the public sector and the UDC rallying for state employ-
ment. But conﬂict potential between UDC and the UGTT is even broader: the
UGTT has adopted an ambivalent view on disruptive unemployed protests
due to what it regards as negative side eﬀects on workers: for instance,
10 I. WEIPERT-FENNER
when protests block phosphate mining activities in the Gafsa basin or the
transportation of phosphate, phosphate processing in Gabes and Sfax is nega-
tively aﬀected, harming workers’ interests as well.29 This negative attitude
towards unemployed protests is not directly targeted at the UDC. Local
UDC protests usually enjoy at least solidarity from UGTT, in part because
they do not employ disruptive techniques that negatively aﬀect workers.
UGTT provides space for UDC activism, e.g. when oﬀering rooms in trade
union buildings for hunger strikes. The UGTT also publicly expresses solidarity
with UDC protests that are ignored by the mainstream media.30 But by con-
tributing to the negative public opinion of protests, they render it more
diﬃcult for the UDC to gain support for their public protests or to win the
trust of independent unemployed protesters who see the UGTT as an adver-
sary to their cause, at least at the regional and national level.31
The alliance of the leftist societal forces has seen its ups and downs in terms
of cohesion. Relations with its other close ally, the student union UGET, have
also suﬀered since the opening of opportunity structures for activism. UDC
activists complained about the growing arrogance of UGET and its decreasing
willingness to co-operate. The unemployed activists occasionally felt as
though UGET was not in need of co-operation partners anymore.32 This sup-
ports the general observation in Tunisia that the removal of the common
enemy, the Ben Ali regime, decreased pressure on these organisations to
co-operate. Since 2011, mobilisation against the Nahda-led government,
especially during the summer 2013 after the assassinations of left-wing poli-
ticians, constituted reason to rally together once again. As soon as the
general crisis was over, the alliance weakened and diverging interests drove
left-wing allies away from one another.33 In sum, the assessment that the
UDC continues to be part of a larger alliance of leftist organisations seems
fair. Concurrently, however, the UDC leadership is well aware of conﬂicting
interests and tries to retain its autonomy, especially from the powerful
trade union federation.
The fear of being instrumentalized is even more widespread in regard to
political actors, despite the rapid development of the political landscape in
post-Ben Ali Tunisia. New parties formed and old parties re-formed (cf. Boube-
keur 2016), while left-wing parties that represented potential co-operation
partners for the UDC could act freely and form an alliance, the Popular
Front. As the UDC constitutes part of the leftist, secular camp, it is clearly
associated with the left-wing party alliance ‘Popular Front’ ( jabha shaabiyya)
led by Hamma Hammami, which generally supports the cause of the UDC
and regularly expresses solidarity with its activities.34 Yet, the alliance
remains weak, holding only 15 of the 217 parliamentary seats, and it has
also willingly refrained from joining any cabinet as a junior coalition
partner. UDC activists, in turn, recurrently feel instrumentalized by the
Popular Front, seeing themselves as being used to provide local support
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and mobilise the anger of the unemployed youth (Antonakis-Nashif 2016,
139). Still, the UDC has few political alternatives in seeking allies, as is
evident when considering the major political forces that have come to dom-
inate the political scene of Tunisia. This landscape is marked by two cleavages:
Islamist versus secular forces, on the one hand, and a classic right-left wing
cleavage on the other. Along the ﬁrst cleavage between Islamists and
secular forces, which has polarised the country and nearly led to a similar
blockade as experienced in Egypt, UDC sees itself clearly as anti-Islamist.
This opinion is shared by the Nahda party that – at least at the national
level – regards the UDC as part of the secular-leftist camp and, as such, as
an unsuitable co-operation partner for resolving the issue of unemploy-
ment.35 The counterweight to al-Nahda that emerged in the years of political
transformation, Nidaa Tunis, has become the major anti-Islamist force. At the
same time, it comprises many former regime elites and is mostly regarded as
business-friendly, in particular to old crony networks. The few left-wing forces
that joined Nidaa Tunis did not have any impact on economic policies (Bou-
bekeur 2016, 121–122). Consequently, Nidaa Tunis lies to the right of the
right-left cleavage. This also holds true for al-Nahda, which favours free-
market economics with a limited role of the state in its political outlook
(Kienle 2015, 7).36
Actors harbouring right-wing, business-oriented political preferences or
preferences for Islamism might not perceive of the UDC as their ﬁrst choice
– though such preferences were generally absent among the independent
unemployed protesters. This is remarkable in regards to Islamism: among
the autonomous protesters, Islamists did not play any role at all, as observed
through the ﬁeld research conducted and explicitly stated by unemployed
activists in interviews. Given the fact that the UDC is actually part of a political
camp that also shares many important aspects with the unemployed protes-
ters outside any formal organisation, without political alternatives at hand, it
seems all the more astonishing that the latter do not desire even loose co-
operation with the UDC. The actual reason for this, as I argue in the next
section, lies in the general form of protest that governments have fostered
over the years, giving beneﬁts to autonomous, ‘non-political’ and purely
‘social’ protests.
The eﬀects of state responses: rewards for fragmentation
So far, the article has considered factors relating to the mobilisation of the
unemployed themselves in order to identify why the only organisation in
this ﬁeld, the UDC, has remained isolated from the majority of fragmented
unemployed protests. A closer look at the eﬀects on mobilisation resulting
from state responses to unemployed protests helps to clarify how the
dynamics of contentious politics have shaped the rationale of unemployed
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protesters. As Beatrice Hibou described in relation to the Gafsa mining basin,
there is a striking continuity of how state actors, particularly national govern-
ments, reacted to unemployed protests before and after the process of demo-
cratisation started. She points out that the general response is to ignore and
neglect socio-economic problems and even protests as long as possible
(Hibou 2015, 339). The situation can shift and be perceived as intolerable
when protesters attract public attention: either because of their sheer
numbers, particularly when spontaneous diﬀusion leads to simultaneous pro-
tests and regional or national waves of protest (such as the January protests in
201637). Attention can also be garnered by disruptive techniques that cause
annoyance for the broader public, such as by blocking roads or railways.
Another strategy is to stage hunger strikes, though activists usually only
manage to gain attention after a few weeks, at the minimum. In such cases,
governments begin to oﬀer concessions by promising development projects,
which, in most cases, never materialise, or, more tangibly, by engaging in
dialogue.
Observations from the ﬁeld highlight the arbitrary nature of these dialo-
gues, with tiny groups of local activists gaining the opportunity to speak
with members of the national cabinet.38 It is not at all clear why a speciﬁc
group is granted access to decision-makers while others are excluded. This
arbitrary, ad-hoc integration is limited to small groups with very speciﬁc
demands, mostly employment for members of that speciﬁc group of protes-
ters beyond any economic or developmental strategy. Employment does not
appear to be a right but is rather granted top-down, underlining the great
power asymmetry in these kinds of negotiations. The selection of negotiation
partners can also be regarded as a divide-and-rule strategy that increases
competition among diﬀerent groups while also rewarding fragmented pro-
tests that shy away from broader demands or forms of organisations that
could be considered ‘political’. Whether this is a conscious decision or an
appeasement strategy shaped by path dependency is hard to tell; yet the
eﬀect is clear: the only ones who get access to decision-makers and, in
some cases, actually achieve their ﬁnal goal – state employment – are those
who do not build alliances with other local unemployed groups or the UDC.
In this sense, national and regional political leaders set the incentive structure
for the unemployed in such a way that rewards fragmentation and punishes
building alliances and organisations.39
The paradoxical observation is that, while trying to present themselves as
‘non-political’ and abide by the old logic of contentious politics, unemployed
activists explicitly touch upon political issues in their critique of clientelist net-
works and the corruption involved in job distribution. Jobs are still regarded as
being distributed either to existing clients (i.e. family, clan members) or in
exchange for money. Yet, instead of criticising this way of top-down employ-
ment, in the interviews, the unemployed stated that protests were the only
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resource they had to trade in an exchange relationship that they see as their
sole access to employment.
Prior to the revolution, repression in the form of violent crack-downs by
security forces was the ultimate instrument used against protesters that the
regime perceived as a threat. This would seem to be the underlying
meaning of ‘political’ protest: an event with organised actors that can unify
various groups, including those with a particular political agenda, and even-
tually build an alliance against the regime. Yet repression is not an option
available to current governments, at least in the form of wide-spread physical
violence. Many UDC activists expressed a feeling of increased repression, yet
by legal means in the form of the arrest and prosecution of protesters.40
However, this implies that ignoring and granting concessions are the only
options left from the old repertoire of state responses when dealing with
unemployed protests. New governments appear to be resorting to just
these practices, creating a vicious cycle that instigates more and more pro-
tests. They all focus on state employment beyond any public debate about
the role the state should have in the economy or about potential private
sector reforms to create decent working conditions.
The dynamics of contentious politics have already led to a tremendous
increase in expenditures since 2011 and have placed a huge burden on the
limited state budget.41 International ﬁnancial institutions are increasingly
pushing for a reduction of public sector employees. But in contrast to the
era of the dictatorship, Hamza Meddeb has shown that the possibilities of dis-
tributing jobs in the private sector also shrank in the post-2011 era (2015).
Under Ben Ali, businessmen were ‘responsive’ to demands for job creation
(on the level of individual cases), as they depended on political good will.
‘Give and take’ was their motto, and the ruling party RCD was the network
through which this relationship was managed. With the dissolution of the
party, no other network has taken its place to mediate between private entre-
preneurs and the jobless. Not even al-Nahda, as a fairly well-organized politi-
cal actor, has been able to do so (Meddeb 2015, 351–353).
As this interplay of protests and state responses traces its roots to the times
of the dictatorship, it becomes clear why being ‘politicized’ is a major obstacle
in the eyes of the protesters. The label jeopardises their chances of success
and may even increase the risk of repression. This is deeply rooted in the
mindset of activists, and in that of the UDC. At the local level, they generally
abide by the script described here, demanding access to state actors such as
the governor or a minister in order to request employment.
Conclusion
In its search for reasons as to why the UDC was incapable of becoming a key
actor for the mobilised unemployed, the article commenced by providing an
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introduction to the broader social meaning of unemployment, particularly for
university graduates. Second, it looked into UDC’s activism since 2011, pro-
posing that the organisation’s major demands share a similar understanding
of unemployment with the general framing of the grievance: a rebellion
against waithood, frustration with corruption and clientelism that block
access to the major goal of state employment and a general lack of develop-
ment in the country’s interior regions. In exploring how the autonomous
unemployed activists reject the UDC on the grounds that it is too weak and
politicised, the article also placed other developments of UDC mobilisation
under scrutiny. The analysis shows a mixed picture in terms of strength and
weakness: on the one hand, the UDC expanded in membership, geographical
outreach and protest activities while also professionalising internal and exter-
nal communication as well as internal democratic procedures. At the same
time, however, it remained small compared to autonomous unemployed pro-
testers, which often go unheard by state actors. Tensions exist between the
national leadership, which pushes for a broader political agenda, and local
oﬃces, whose activities resemble isolated protests outside of any formal
organisation with a sole focus on personal employment.
Third, the article assessed the UDC’s relationships with societal and political
actors, more profoundly investigating the accusation by the autonomous pro-
testers of the organisation being ‘politicized’. An analysis of the relationship
between the UDC and its main societal allies – the leftist student union and
the trade union federation UGTT – reveals tensions and a constant attempt
by the UDC to retain a high degree of autonomy; the same holds true for
its relationship with political parties. In general, the UDC strives to retain its
autonomy due to a fear of being instrumentalized. Despite such attempts,
independent protesters perceive the UDC as being politicised, and co-oper-
ation as a threat to their interests. In the last section, I argue that this may
be explained by the incentive structure set by successive governments
which rewards non-political protests (in regard to demands and co-operation
partners). Government responses over the decades had the sole aim of sedat-
ing protests, at least for the short term, by granting concessions at the individ-
ual level and on an ad-hoc basis as a reward for ‘non-political’ protests. Any
serious co-operation with organised actors was met with repression and/or
neglect. As long as the successive governments continue to grant employ-
ment to this speciﬁc form of unemployed protest, co-operation with the
UDC for broader and sustainable change will appear a risky gamble that
poor people, particularly the unemployed in the marginalised interior
regions, will likely shy away from.
However, this analysis also suggests a few speciﬁc steps to escape the spiral
of escalating protests. Merely asking for patience, as successive governments
have done since 2011, is not a realistic response for those rebelling against the
on-going wait for their lives to begin. A start could be pursuing initial reforms
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in the way that jobs are distributed: transparency and accountability within
recruitment procedures would make job distribution according to political
considerations much more diﬃcult. It would also avoid protests against (alleg-
edly) corrupt recruitment procedures which erupt regardless of whether they
were corrupt in a speciﬁc case or not. The most important move would be
integrating unemployed organisations, in an institutionalised manner,
within broader social dialogues and negotiations about developmental strat-
egies at a local, regional and national level; this could be linked to on-going
reforms aimed at decentralisation in Tunisia. Incentives should be provided
for the unemployed to organise, accumulate interests and demands and
articulate them through one or more organisations. These could oﬀer the
possibility of participating in the distribution of resources, such as unemploy-
ment beneﬁts or state-sponsored jobs, as part of a broader developmental
agenda, particularly for marginalised interior regions. Integrating the UDC
by keeping consultative or decision-making forums open to new organis-
ations could foster positive development towards rallying together rather
than heightening fragmentation. This does, however, demand the political
will to cede some power when integrating more actors within deliberation
processes and to truly depart from the structures and logics of behaviour
inherited from Ben Ali’s authoritarian regime.
Considering the continuity in state responses to unemployed protests in
spite of Tunisia’s relatively successful democratisation, as uncovered by this
article, comparisons with other unemployed organisations in the region
would prove a promising next step for further exploring social mobilisation
of the most pressing socio-economic grievance in the region. Youth unem-
ployment rates in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) are the highest
in the world, with a rate of nearly 25 per cent that is twice as high as the
world average (12.5 per cent). Those most aﬀected are individuals with
higher levels of education (ILO 2015). Apart from Tunisia, only Algeria and
Morocco have witnessed the development of major movements of the unem-
ployed. In other countries in the MENA region, the unemployed have not
come together to mobilise yet, not even in countries with similarly high unem-
ployment rates among university graduates such as Egypt or Jordan (cf. Mot-
taghi 2014).42 The two other cases of unemployed mobilisation exhibit
interesting patterns of contentious politics which also underline the impor-
tance of state responses to the unemployed. In Morocco, a number of unem-
ployed organisations have evolved since the 1990s, most of which have been
co-opted by the state. Protests solely focus on the topic of labour, and as a
reward for refraining from politics, the state grants jobs to these unemployed
organisations who then internally distribute jobs to their most active
members (Emperador Badimon 2013). In Algeria, a national organisation for
the unemployed was founded in 2011 in the wake of the regional wave of
uprisings. It remained critical of the government’s eﬀorts to buy oﬀ
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discontent, a stance for which it has faced heavy repression (Roberts 2015,
164, 178). Unemployed mobilisation in marginalised regions in southern
Algeria gained nation-wide attention in 2013, yet has to date remained a per-
ipheral phenomenon (Belakhdar 2015). With the Tunisian example in mind,
the protests in Algeria seem to represent the seeds of broader unemployed
mobilisation, similar to what Tunisia witnessed in 2008, eventually helping
to ignite and spread mass protests in 2010/2011 (Allal 2013). However, the
Tunisian case also warns us of the ambiguities inherent to democratisation
processes: apart from possibly leading to further fragmentation rather than
co-operation, it also stands as a reminder of the continuity in the political prac-
tices of actors and institutions which persist beyond a regime change. The
observations made in the Tunisian case also relate to debates on the role of
socioeconomic grievances in political transformation processes. As was pro-
minently discussed in transitology literature in the 1980s, leaving aside
broader questions of social redistribution while re-drawing the political
system was argued to be the best solution for creating a stable political
order. Elites from the old regime would be more willing to cooperate and
support the new order if their vested interests were left untouched (O’Donnell
and Schmitter 1986, 27). Indeed, in the Tunisian case, socioeconomic struc-
tures have remained unchanged after the fall of Ben Ali – for the time
being. Yet, this will most probably not be the end of the story, especially if
we consider other world regions: the ‘leftist turn’ in Latin America, for instance,
occurred roughly one decade after the political transformations of the long
1980s. Of course, this turn manifested in diﬀerent paths through which the
social question was brought up once more and it led to widely varying
degrees of social redistribution – yet all in the framework of democratic
regimes (cf. Luna and Filgueira 2009; Silva and Rossi 2018). As Tunisia is cur-
rently the only democracy in the Arab world, it is likely that, in the mid to
long-term, we will observe new waves and forms of socioeconomic conten-
tion with substantial political impacts and that will greatly diﬀer from socioe-
conomic mobilisation in other parts of the MENA region.
Notes
1. A protest is regarded here as ‘socioeconomic’ when the protesters’ main
demands are socioeconomic in nature. According to Weipert-Fenner and
Wolﬀ (2015, 5–6), these demands relate to productive activities (access to
land, subsidies, credits and taxes), basic social services (public services, health,
education, water, transport and price/tariﬀ subsidies), income (wages, pensions
and work) and worker rights (such as the right to organise and employment
standards).
2. For more information on methodology, advantages and challenges of the data-
base, see Vatthauer and Weipert-Fenner (2017, 9).
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3. This becomes visible in the fourth wave of the Arab Barometer, in which 59 per
cent of respondents said that democracy was bad for the economy – in contrast
to only 24 per cent in 2011.
4. For instance, during the Gafsa mining revolt of 2008, autonomous unemployed
protesters co-operated with the Union of Unemployed Graduates (being studied
here), the Tunisian trade union federation (UGTT), opposition parties and NGOs
(see Gobe 2010; Allal 2010).
5. Interview with Salam al-Ayari, unoﬃcial leader of the UDC since its foundation
and elected general secretary since 2013; Tunis, March 2015.
6. Interview with Salam al-Ayari, Tunis, March 2015.
7. Interviews conducted in the Gafsa mining basin (Oum Larayes, Redeyef) in
November 2016.
8. I follow Erica Simmons (2016), who argues that one key to understanding the
dynamics of contentious politics is not the severity of grievances as such but
rather their social meaning.
9. Around 30 interviews were conducted in Gabes, Gafsa, Oum Larayes, Redeyef,
Sfax and Tunis in November 2014, March 2015 and October and November
2016. Additional participant observation and focus groups were possible
during the World Social Forum in Tunis in March 2015.
10. Data from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), accessed at http://data.
lesechos.fr/pays-indicateur/tunisie/taux-de-chomage.html.
11. Institut national de la statistique (INS). http://www.ins.nat.tn/indexfr.php.
12. A similar concept of unemployment among activists is found in Morocco, see
Emperador Badimon (2013).
13. Tunis, March 2015.
14. Interview with Salam al-Ayari, Tunis, March 2015. These numbers seem plausible
as the event data set showed activities in every governorate. If only 100 people
were active in the UDC in each governorate, then 2,000 active members can be
regarded as a realistic estimate. Yet, these numbers need to be treated with
caution to some extent as it is impossible to verify this information with an
additional source. Furthermore, membership is highly ﬂuctuating, as new uni-
versity graduates regularly join the ranks of the UDC while newly recruited indi-
viduals most often leave the organisation.
15. See the monthly reports at www.ftdes.net. The FTDES analyses media coverage
of protests and also collects its own data via its regional oﬃces. While this data
cannot of course be directly compared to the numbers of events collected in
Facebook posts, the discrepancy corresponds to empirical observations and
expert opinions on unemployed protests in Tunisia.
16. Interviews with UDC activists, Tunis, March 2015.
17. According to the Facebook database, 22 out of 33 solidarity events took place
during the ﬁrst six months of 2015.
18. In the ﬁrst six months of 2015, UDC activists staged seven hunger strikes, a sharp
increase from just two in 2014.
19. In the cases of Ireland (Chabanet and Faniel 2012, 10) and Argentina (Delmata
2004, 9–11), for instance, state subsidies were administered by unemployed
organisations themselves. In Morocco, the state allows unemployed graduate
organisations to submit lists with members as proposed new recruits for the
public sector and civil service. In exchange, the organisations organise unem-
ployed protests in a ritualised manner that do not question the legitimacy of
the regime (Emperador Badimon 2013).
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20. Interview with Salam Ayari, and group interviews, Tunis, March 2015.
21. Interview with UDC activist on hunger strike, March 2015, Tunis, and the leader
of the UDC in Redeyef, October 2016. See also Antonakis-Nashif 2016, 137.
22. Interview with Salam Ayari, group interview with activists in the national oﬃce,
March 2015, Tunis.
23. The trigger in 2016 was the tragic death of Ridha Yahyaoui in Kasserine, who had
been listed in 2015 but was removed from the list a year later. Protesting against
this injustice, he climbed a utility pole and was electrocuted. His death sparked
nation-wide protests between 17–29 January 2016.
24. According to the Facebook database, three-fourths of all protests against repres-
sion since September 2011 occurred between 2014 and June 2015, and 22 out of
33 solidarity events took place during the ﬁrst six months of 2015.
25. One example was President Beji Qaid Essebsi’s immediate reaction to the Sousse
terrorist attack (Marzouki 2015). See also: https://nawaat.org/portail/2016/01/30/
la-criminalisation-des-mouvements-sociaux-est-de-retour/, http://nawaat.org/
portail/2015/04/12/linterminable-lutte-sociale-entre-la-prison-et-la-mort/.
http://nawaat.org/portail/2017/04/05/radicalisation-et-mouvements-sociaux-
meme-contexte-diﬀerents-combats/.
26. Studies of unemployment movements in Europe suggest a positive correlation
between the level of education and political activism (Lahusen 2013, 9).
27. Group interview with UDC activists, Tunis, March 2015.
28. Interview Salam al-Ayari, Tunis, March 2015; Group interview with UDC activists,
Tunis, March 2015, October 2016.
29. Furthermore, UGTT representatives criticised that unemployed protests often
lead to concessions that grant jobs to individuals who are neither justiﬁed in
terms of economic need nor personal capabilities. Interview with a member of
the UGTT executive board, Tunis, November 2014.
30. Group interview with UDC activists, Tunis, March 2015.
31. The local level of trade unionists usually sympathise with unemployed protests
and risk conﬂict with the upper echelons of the federation, interviews with local
UGTT leaders in Redeyef and Oum Larayes, October 2016. See also Yousﬁ 2015;
Vatthauer and Weipert-Fenner 2017).
32. Group interview with UDC activists, Tunis, March 2015.
33. Occasionally, UGET and UDC ﬁnd a joint cause to rally around, for instance
against the ban of former student union activists from being hired in the
public and civil sector, which was enacted under the Ben Ali regime and has
remained in force after the revolution. http://directinfo.webmanagercenter.
com/2016/04/13/tunisie-luget-et-ludc-vont-entamer-des-protestations-
regionales/.
34. Hamma Hammami, interview, Tunis, March 2015.
35. Interview with al-Nahda student union leader, Tunis, March 2015.
36. The policies that successive governments – always dominated either by al-
Nahda or Nidaa Tunis – have actually implemented, however, demonstrate a
mix of étatist and liberal policies that do not correspond to the positions of
the parties expressed in their programmes or interviews (cf. Kienle 2015, 25).
This is partially explained in the next section.
37. https://nawaat.org/portail/2016/01/25/cartographie-de-la-contestation-le-
mouvement-social-continue/.
38. Interviews with independent unemployed activists, Redeyef, Oum Larayes,
November 2016.
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39. One large-scale example of this logic of contentious politics was the distribution
of 5,000 jobs after the mass uprising of January 2016 that started in Kasserine.
Jobs simply created to appease protests were distributed to unemployed
outside any formal organisation. https://www.leconomistemaghrebin.com/
2016/01/20/kasserine-recrutement-5000-chomeurs-creation-projets/.; https://
nawaat.org/portail/2016/01/22/after-kasserine-protests-break-out-in-16-
governorates/.
40. Interviews with UDC activists, October 2016, Tunis. This was also found in claims
from the analysis of UDC Facebook posts.
41. State expenditure for public sector wages increased from 6 billion Tunisian Dinar
(ca. 3 billion Euros) to 13.2 billion dinar (5.3 billion Euros) in 2016 (Muasher,
Pierini, and Aliriza 2016, 8).
42. This corresponds well to global patterns of the emergence of unemployed
mobilisation (e.g., Chabanet and Faniel 2012; Giugni 2008; Reiss and Perry
2011). From a social movement perspective, this also makes perfect sense, as
grievances alone cannot explain mobilisation. They become relevant in the
context of their social meaning (Simmons 2016), embedded in frameworks of
collective action (Benford and Snow 2000), contextualised in social networks
and the perception of political opportunities and threats (McAdam, Tarrow,
and Tilly 2001).
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